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This paper describes a new household-level data file based on merged
information from the IRS Individual Tax File, the Current Population
Survey, the National Medical Expenditure Survey, and the Consumer
Expenditure Survey. This new file includes descriptive data on house-
hold income as well as consumption. The data file can be linked to the
NBER TAXSIM program and used to evaluate the distributional effects
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of changing the federal income tax code, as well as the distributional
effects of replacing the individual income tax with a consumption tax.
We use this data file to analyze the long-run distributional effects of
adopting a national retail sales tax that raises enough revenue to replace
the current federal individual income tax and corporation income tax, as
well as federal estate and gift taxes. Our results highlight the sensitivity
of the change in distributional burdens to provisions such as lump sum
transfers, sometimes called "demogrants," in the retail sales tax plan,
and to the choice between income and consumption as a basis for catego-
rizing households in distribution tables.
1. INTRODUCTION
The "flat tax" debate has drawn new attention to the distribution of tax
burdens under the current income tax system compared to that under
alternative tax regimes. Unlike calculations of the differential burdens of
alternative income tax plans, which can be based largely on data for
current income tax filers, complete analysis of the steady state distribu-
tion of tax burdens under consumption-based tax systems requires infor-
mation not just on income flows, but also on consumption outlays for a
sample of households. No single data set includes all of this information,
so any distributional analysis requires combining informationfrom differ-
ent public use data files.
Samples of tax returns such as the Statistics of Income Individual Tax
File are the standard source of information on taxable income, but tax
returns do not include any direct information on the level or pattern of
household consumption spending. The data bases that provide detailed
information on consumption spending, such as the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey (CES), do not have any detailed information on many ele-
ments of taxable income, and they provide only sketchy information
regarding the high-income households that are often the focus of discus-
sion in tax reform debates. The absence of information on passive losses,
capital gain realizations, and many other factors makes it particularly
difficult to estimate the income tax liabilities of high-income households
using data files such as the CES. The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics,
a standard data source on household incomes thathas been used in a
number of academic studies of how income affects consumption spend-
ing, contains information on only a small number of consumption vari-
ables, such as food, utilities, and rent, that together account for a limited
fraction of household budgets.
Many of the previous attempts to compare the distribution of tax bur-National Retail Sales Tax51
dens under income and consumption taxes are incomplete. Others have
been conducted by various government agencies, and full details on the
procedures used to link consumption and income have not been released
to the research community. Nunns (1995) notes that the Office of Tax
Analysis employs a merged data base of the type developed here; Kasten
and Toder (1995) describe a similar data base at the Congressional Budget
Office, and Barthold and Jack (1995) allude to similar data developed by
the Joint Committee on Taxation. Many household-level comparisons
between the current income tax and potential consumption tax options
fail to consider the distribution of corporate income tax payments, and
their allocation across households, even though such imputed payments
can represent a sizable fraction of the income tax burden, especially for
high-income households. A related difficulty is the failure to consider the
estate tax. Many proposals to reform the income tax system are packaged
with proposals to eliminate the estate tax, and it is therefore important to
develop an estimate of the distribution of estate tax burdens.
Another common difficulty with tax plan comparisons is the absence
of information on individuals who do not currently file income tax re-
turns. It is particularly important to identify these nonfilers when analyz-
ing the distributional effects of consumption taxes administered at the
retail level, since individuals who are currently outside the income tax
system will face retail sales tax liability.
In this paper, we develop a new data base with information on
household-level income, consumption spending, and tax liability. We
extend the IRS Individual Income Tax File, the data file that is the basis for
distributional analysis of income tax reforms using the NBER TAXSIM
program, in four directions. First, we include nonfilers in the analysis. We
identify households in the Current Population Survey that are designated
as nonfilers, and we add the data records for these households to the
Individual Income Tax File. Second, we include an estimate of corporate
income taxes, and estate and gift taxes, paid on behalf of all potential tax-
filing units in our analysis. Third, we impute to each potential tax filing
unit in our expanded data base total and disaggregate consumption spend-
ing using information from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Finally,
because the CES only includes information on out-of-pocket medical ex-
penditures, we impute consumption of medical services using data from
the National Medical Expenditure Survey.
The resulting data base, while it cannot answer some of the questions
that can be addressed with a household-level survey with information
on income and consumption, provides us with the capacity to analyze
the distributional effects of a range of tax reform proposals. In the cur-52Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
rent paper we focus on proposals for a retail sales tax. Our analysis
focuses on the long-run effects of replacing the current income tax, or
the income tax and payroll tax, with a retail sales tax. We develop distri-
bution tables based on household consumption spending, and a proxy
for lifetime income, as well as a "snapshot" annual income measure, and
compute the distribution of tax burdens under various tax reform plans.
We do not consider the transitional incidence effects that would be asso-
ciated with changes in the real value of assets at the time of tax reform.
Analyzing these transitional effects would require merging additional
data on asset holdings to data on income and consumption outlays.
The current paper is divided into five sections. The first summarizes
the retail sales tax and presents calculations, based on aggregate data
from the National Income and Product Accounts, of the tax rate at which
the retail sales tax could raise the same amount of revenue as the current
income, or income and payroll, tax system. Section two describes the
details of our data linkage algorithm. It summarizes the procedures that
we use to merge nonfilers into the Tax File, to impute consumptionand
medical spending to our data records for tax filers and nonfilers, and to
impute corporate and estate and gift tax liability to tax filers and
nonfilers. The third section presents the results of our comparative distri-
butional analysis of the current income and payroll tax system and a
potential retail sales tax system. Section four discusses a number of
transitional issues that arise with regard to the retail sales tax. The final
section summarizes our findings and discusses other potential applica-
tions of the framework developed in this paper.
2. ESTIMATING THE RETAIL SALES TAX RATE:
AGGREGATE CALCULATIONS
This section considers the definition of the retail sales tax base, and pres-
ents simple calculations of the retail sales tax rate that would raise the
same amount of revenue as the current federal income tax system, or the
income tax and payroll tax systems. We present such estimates using
National Income and Product Account (NIPA) data for calendar year 1991
as published in the January/February 1996 issue of the Survey of Current
Business, because our subsequent distributional analysis relies on data
from 1991.
Table 1 shows the 1991 revenues associated with the federal income
tax as well as the payroll tax. The entry for corporate income tax reve-
nues excludes contributions to the federal treasury from Federal Reserve
banks ($20.8 billion), since such tax payments would continue under a
National Retail Sales Tax (NRST). Total 1991 tax payments under theTABLE 1
Federal Income and Payroll Taxes,
1991 ($billions)
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, Survey of
Current Business January/February 1996.
income tax system, including personal income taxes, estate and gift
taxes, and the corporate income tax, were$564.4billion.1 Including fed-
eral OASDI and Medicare taxes raises the revenue total by another
$376.6billion, to$941billion.
The retail sales tax base can be estimated using the National Income
Accounts concept of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) from
NIPA Table2.4as a starting point. Total personal consumption expendi-
tures equalled$3,975.1billion in1991.There are several reasons, however,
why the sales tax base would differ from the PCE aggregate. The most
important adjustments to this consumption flow are described below.2
2.1 Adjusting PCE for Indirect Taxes
Personal consumption expenditures in the NIPA include outlays for
indirect taxes, such as state sales taxes and federal excise taxes. Such tax
payments would not be part of the retail sales tax base, and it is therefore
1The National Income and Product Accounts report income tax liabilities on a payments
basis. The entry for 1991, for example, shows all individual income taxes paid during
calendar year 1991. The individual income tax returns in the Tax File that we use in later
sections report tax liability. A household's 1991 tax liability may include some tax that was
paid in 1992. Aggregate tax liabffity and tax payments can differ for a given year; Park
(1994) reports that for 1991, this difference is roughly $16 billion. We use the payment
measure in our aggregate analysis of the retail sales tax, and rescale the liability data on
individual tax returns to match this aggregate in our analysis below.
2Bartlett (1995) and Burton and Mastromarco (1996) discuss a number of issues associated
with the retail sales tax base and the administration of the tax.
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Personal income tax $464.4
Estate & gift taxes 11.0
Corporate profits taxes 89.0
Total income taxes 564.4
Employer payroll tax 177.5
Employee payroll tax 177.9
Self-Employed payroll tax 21.2
Total payroll taxes 376.6
Total income & payroll taxes 941.054Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
necessary to subtract these taxes from the consumption aggregate.NIPA
Table 3.5 disaggregates receipts from state and local sales taxes and
federal excise taxes by category. The taxes that are paid at the retail level
include state and local general sales taxes ($127.8 billion), specialized
state and local excise taxes on gasoline, alcoholic beverages, tobacco,and
public utilities ($43.5 billion total), and specialized federal excise taxes on
gasoline, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and air transport ($32.3 billion).
The unspecified category of "other" federal, state, and local excise taxes
($20.5 billion) is also assumed to be paid at the retail level; this adjust-
ment will tend to understate the retail sales tax base. The total adjust-
ment to PCE for these indirect taxes is $224.1 billion. This amount must
be subtracted from personal consumption expenditures in defining the
retail sales tax base.3
2.2 Owner-Occupied Housing in the Retail Sales Tax Base
One difficulty in defining the retail sales tax base arises with respect to
owner-occupied housing. The equivalent "rental income" from such hous-
ing is imputed in the National Income and Product Accounts. It is not ob-
served in a market transaction. Because taxing such imputed rent requires
estimating its value on a household-by-household basis, and could involve
substantial administrative burdens that would not otherwise be necessary
under a retail sales tax, we follow the "prepayment method" of taxation
and exclude imputed rent from the retail sales tax base, while including the
value of new owner-occupied homes at their time of purchase.4
To adjust PCE to recognize this prepayment treatment of owner-
occupied housing, we need to subtract imputed rent from PCE, and to
add to it the value of owner-occupied housing purchases. In 1991, the
NIPA imputation for space rent on owner-occupied nonfarm housing
(Table 2.4) was $434.1 billion. The analogous imputation for farm hous-
ing, which we assume to be owner-occupied, was $5.2 billion. NIPA
Table 5.6 reports purchases of new single-family permanent site struc-
tures of $95.4 billion, purchases of mobile homes of $4.3 billion, andtotal
improvements to residential property of $47.2 billion.5 We assume that
Unlike state and local sales taxes, property taxes on owner-occupied housing are not
included in NIPA personal consumption expenditures. They are tabulated in personal tax
and nontax payments, and therefore do not need to be subtracted from PCE in arriving at
the retail sales tax base.
Graetz (1980) demonstrates the equivalence of the prepayment method and other ways
of taxing the service flow from durable goods.
The ratio of new home sales to imputed rent may be sensitive to macroeconomic fluctua-
tions that affect the level of new construction, so the relationship between these two
measures of the tax base would in practice differ depending on theparticular year chosen
for the analysis.National Retail Sales Tax 55
all purchases of single-family homes represent purchases ofowner-
occupied homes for this part of our calculation.
Improvements to existing structures would also be taxed under the
prepayment analysis. We allocate improvements between single-family
homes and multifamily structures in proportion to their shares ofnew
permanent-site investment. New multifamily residential investmentwas
$15.1 billion in 1991. This implies that 95.41(15.1 + 95.4),or 0.863, times
the value of total improvements can be consideredas additions to the
stock of owner-occupied real estate, which implies estimated improve-
ments to single-family structures of $40.8 (0.863 x 47.2) billion.
The net effect of these adjustments, which render the retail salestax
base substantially smaller than PCE, is shown below.
Purchases of new single-family homes $95.4 billion
Purchases of new mobile homes 4.3
Improvements to single-family homes 40.8
Space rent on owner-occupied housing (434.1)
Space rent on farm housing (5.2)
Total adjustment for owner-occupied housing (298.8) bfflion
2.3 Other Adjustments
NIPA imputes the difference between income and outlays of banks,
credit agencies, and investment companies to the household sectoras
implicit services of financial intermediaries. This component of personal
consumption expenditures would not be taxed under some versions ofa
retail sales tax. This imputed interest flow equals $133.2 billion for 1991
(NIPA Table 8.18); we subtract this amount from PCE in estimating the
retail sales tax base.
In addition, several additional sub-categories of consumptionare
likely to be excluded from the retail sales tax base because theyare
difficult to measure or administratively difficult to tax. These include
foreign travel ($39.7 billion), spending by U.S. residents in other nations
($3.8 bfflion), and food produced and consumed on farms (0.6 billion).6
We do not explicitly consider potential compliance difficulties with the
retail sales tax. This issue arises both with respect to current under-
ground economy transactions, which are not reported andare therefore
not part of the income tax or the retail sales tax base, as wellas transac-
tions that might be hidden from the tax authority under the retail sales
6The Treasury Department's (1984) discussion of value-added taxation also excludedsev-
eral other categories of consumption, such as outlays on education, religious and welfare
groups, local mass transit, and domestic services, as administratively or politically difficult
to tax. We have not excluded these items from our retail sales tax base.56Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
TABLE 2
Adjustments to Personal Consumption Expenditures to Estimate the
Retail Sales Tax Base
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the National Income and Product Accounts asreported
in the January/February 1996 Survey of Current Business See text for further description.
tax but not under the current system. The PCE aggregate doesinclude
an estimate of otherwise-unreportedconsumption spending.
2.4 Implications for the Retail Sales Tax Rate
Table 2 summarizes the net effect of the various adjustments to personal
consumption expenditures that are described above. The NRST rate
equals required revenue, $564.4 billion in the case of the income tax and
$941 billion for the income and payroll taxes, divided by the taxbase
($3,274.9). This translates into a retail sales tax rate of 17.2 percent to
replace the income tax, and 28.7 percent to replace both the income and
payroll taxes.7 This calculation applies to a retail sales tax without any
exclusions from the tax base or any lump-sum transfers designed to alter
the distributional characteristics of the tax burden. In the detailed calcula-
tions we present below, we consider the effect of such exclusionsand
modifications on the pattern of distributional burdens.
Some retail sales tax proposals call for taxing some or all government
purchases. If the federal government adopted a policy of collecting sales
tax on all of its own purchases, such a tax would collectprecisely the
same amount in revenue that it would cost thefederal government, and
it would have no effect. This assumes that federal spending in nominal
dollars could rise to reflect the higher tax-inclusive price of federal pur-
chases. If tax-inclusive spending was fixed at its pre-retail sales tax level,
then taxing federal purchases would shrink the real value of federal
spending. This would not represent a standard experiment in tax inci-
These tax rates are presented in the same manner as current state retail sales taxes:the
tax rate is a percentage of the producer price. It would also be possible to report tax rates as
a fraction of the total consumer price, tI(1 + t); these rateswould be lower but would
correspond to the same revenue potential.
NIPA personal consumption spending $3,975.1 billion
Adjustment for indirect taxes (224.1)
Adjustment for owner-occupied housing (298.8)
Adjustment for imputed financial services (133.2)
Adjustment for "difficult to tax" items (44.1)
Retail sales tax base $3,274.9 billionNational Retail Sales Tax 57
dence analysis, since it would change both the set of goods purchased
by the government and the tax system.
Including state and local government purchases in the retail salestax
base would have different effects, since therevenue collected by the
federal government would not necessarily be transferred tostates and
localities to offset the higher cost of their purchases. One particular
proposal, which illustrates the approach, would apply the retail salestax
to all government spending other than employee compensation. In 1991,
state and local governments spent $265.5 on non-payroll items. If this
spending were added to the retail sales tax base, the required retail sales
tax rate would fall to 15.9 percent for the income tax replacement, and to
26.6 percent for the income and payroll tax replacement.
Federal revenue in this case is generated by taxing state and local
government purchases, and a complete incidence analysis would need
to specify the distribution of gains and losses from reduced real expendi-
hires by states and localities. Because such an analysis requires strong
and ad hoc assumptions about the benefit distribution,we do not con-
sider such proposals in our analysis below.
3. THE EXPANDED TAX FILE DATA BASE
Our empirical work is directed toward generatinga new data file with
information on income, individual income tax payments, imputedcor-
porate, estate, and gift taxes, and estimates of consumption expendi-
hires for each household. To create this file, we combined data from
Statistics of Income Public Use Individual Tax File (the Tax File) with
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), the National Medical
Expenditure Survey (NMES), and the Consumer Expenditure Survey
(CES).
Our development of this data base proceeded in six steps, whichare
detailed below. First, we used CPS data to add informationon nonfiling
households to the Tax File. Second, we imputed consumption expendi-
tures to all households in the Tax FileCPS file by developinga synthetic
match with the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Third,we augmented
the CES-based information on consumption with additional dataon
medical expenditures from the NMES. Fourth,we imputed corporate
income tax payments to households in the Tax FileCPS data file. Fifth,
we imputed estate and gift tax liability to the households in our resulting
data base. Finally, we used data from the Current Population Surveyto
allocate labor income within households betweenmen and women, so
that we could calculate payroll tax liabilities. This section describes the
procedures that we followed in each step of this process.58Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
3.1 Augmenting the Tax File to Include Non-Filers
One difficulty with distributional analyses basedsolely on the Tax File is
that this data file is based on tax return filings and assuch excludes
households that do not file tax returns. In 1991, single individualswith
adjusted gross income below $5,500, and married couples with income
below $10,000 were not required to file tax returns. In addition, many
households have income that is not subject to tax, such as interest on
municipal bonds, so that their household income exceeds thecutoffs
even though they are not tax filers. Becausesuch households would
incur tax liability under a retail sales tax, it is important toinclude them
in any distributional analysis.
Our long-range intention is to obtain a sample of actualnonfilers from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP),and to merge
these nonfilers with the data records in the Tax File. However,initial work
with SIPP 1990 Wave 5 showed an implausible amount of wageand other
income for self-declared nonfiling couples. We thereforefollowed an alter-
native strategy. Recently, the Current Population Survey (CPS)has im-
puted tax fifing status for all adult respondents. Although theCPS imputa-
tion is based on income and probable withholding, the Censushas access
to an exact match file linking the CPS with IRS masterfiles of tax returns.
The CPS imputation of tax filing status is therefore likely to bemuch more
accurate than any imputation that we might carry out.
We use the CPS imputation of filing status to identify asubsample of
CPS respondents who are nonfilers. From the March 1992CPS, we have
extracted individuals over 18 years of age and married coupleswith an
imputed status of "nonifier" and added them to the Tax File. Younger
persons living with norifilers are counted asdependents. Income in-
formation for 1991, including benefits received fromsocial welfare
programs, is taken from the CPS without change,and the CPS March
Supplemental Weight is used for scaling to U.S. population totals.
This procedure yields 13.3 million households that were nonfilers ac-
cording to the CPS imputation algorithm. Of this group, 8.8 million are
one-person households and another 2.6million are two-person house-
holds. Table 3 presents summary information on the distribution of filers
and nonfilers by income category. The income variable is definedbased
on the Form 1040 concept of gross income,and also includes transfer
income for households that are drawn from the CPS data base.
The first column of Table 3, which reports the number of potential tax
filers, shows the total number of households in each income rangethat
we identified based on both the Tax Fileand the CPS nonfiler data base.
The second column reports the fraction of households in each incomeNational Retail Sales Tax59
TABLE 3
Distribution of Filers and Non-filers by Income Class
Source: Authors' calculations based on Tax FileCPS data file. The income concept used to allocate
households to classes includes all cash income items but does not indude the imputed value of owner
occupied housing in excess of cash outlays on housing or medical expenses that are not out of pocket.
The income concept used in Tables 5-12 does include these imputations.
category who actually file tax returns. Not surprisingly, the nonfilersare
heavily concentrated in cells with low household income. Justover half
of the nonfilers are estimated to have household incomes of less than
$5,000. The finding that more than one-third of households with in-
comes below $10,000 are identified as nonfilers underscores the impor-
tance of adding nonfilers to the tax return data base before performing
distributional analyses.8
3.2 Matching the Tax File/CPS Sample to the Consumer
Expenditure Survey
After augmenting the Tax File with the CPS sample of nonfilers,we
imputed consumption expenditures to all of the households in thisex-
panded data base.9 We did this with a random matching algorithm that
links each Tax File or CPS record to a "similar" record in the 1991 Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey. The critical step in this process was defining
"similar "We sorted households on several dimensions: the total value
of gross income including welfare benefits10, the number ofpersons in
In constructing distribution tables, we exclude households with negative reported in-
comes. These are primarily households with large reported losses on their tax returns. This
does not substantially affect our findings and preserves comparabffity betweenour various
methods of computing distribution tables.
Okner (1974) and subsequent symposium papers discuss potential pitfalls thatmay arise
in merging information from one data set to data from a second data set.
10We define this income concept as the sum of wages, business income, farm and rental
income, dividends, interest, pensions, Social Security income, SSI, unemployment, work-
ers compensation, welfare, and the value of Food Stamps.
Household income
Total number (millions)
of tax filing units
Fraction of tax
filing units that file
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the household, whether or not there is anyone in the household overthe
age of 65, and whether the householdhas capital income in excess of
$2,500 per year. Each of these variables was chosen because it can be
measured in both the Tax FileCPS data file and in the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey. These characteristics therefore provide a basis forlinking
households in the two files.11
The Consumer Expenditure Survey data that we analyzed are from an
edited version of the 1990 through 1992 CES Family-Level data files;this
data base and its relation to aggregate consumption measures arede-
scribed in Sabethaus (1996). We assigned CES households to cellsbased
on the four characteristics noted above.In some cases, for example, for
households with one or two members near the middle of the incomedistri-
bution, there were several hundred observations in a cell. Inother cells,
however, particularly high income cells and cells with elderlyindividuals
and more than two members in the household, there wererelatively few
CES households. To ensure a reasonable sample for our randommatching
algorithm, we imposed the rule that when a cell had fewer than ten mem-
bers, it was combined with another cell containing householdsthat were
similar along at least two, but often three, of the four classifyingdimen-
sions. Table 4 shows the resulting number of CES households ineach of
the various cells that we used to impute consumption outlays tothe Tax
FileCPS data file. It also shows the set of household groupingalong in-
come and demographic dimensionsthat we used in our analysis.
Our algorithm for imputing consumption outlays to TaxFileCPS
households proceeded as follows. Each record in the combined Tax File
CPS data file was assigned to the appropriate income/demographiccell,
using our CES-based categories to define these cells. We thenselected, by
random draw recognizing the different sample weightsfor different
households, one of the CES households in this cell. We calculated the
ratio of total consumption expenditure to household income, aswell as
the ratios of several sub-categories of consumption to householdincome,
for this household, and we then multiplied these ratios by thehousehold
income of the household in the Tax FileCPS data file to estimate its
consumption spending. We used ratios of consumption to income to carry
out our imputation because this procedure reducedthe incidence of ex-
treme consumption values at low and high income levels. Evenwith this
procedure, however, some of the consumption imputations appear ex-
11We selected a capital income threshold of $2,500 per year based onsimple regression
analysis of consumption expenditures on income, household size, an indicatorvariable for
an elderly household member, and a set of indicatorvariables for capital income above or
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consumption class
TABLE 5
Ratio of Consumption to Income
Source: Authors' tabulations using Tax FileCPS-CES merged file as described in the text.Income
concept used includes the imputed value of owner occupied housing in excess ofoutofpocket hous-
ing expenses, and medical expenses that are not out of pocket. The entries in the last row indicatethe
ratio of total consumption to total income in the class, not the average ratio acrosshouseholds.
treme. There are many households in low income categorieswith im-
puted consumption several times greater than their income. This primar-
ily reflects the relationship of consumption and income in theCES data
file, rather than a problem that is created by our matchingalgorithm.
Table 5 presents summary information on total consumption (C), in-










0-5k 6.2 3,362 3,957 0.850
5k-bk 14.1 7,677 9,889 0.776
10k-15k 17.5 12,532 17,059 0.735
15k-20k 16.1 17,430 22,967 0.759
20k-30k 25.4 24,710 32,446 0.762
30k-40k 16.7 34,561 45,420 0.761
40k-50k 9.5 44,548 57,708 0.772
50k-75k 9.0 59,503 73,005 0.815
75k-look 2.1 84,958 103,901 0.818
bOOk-200k 1.3 130,126 177,114 0.735
Over 200k
income class










0-5k 9.8 10,250 2,222 4.614
5k-bk 13.2 12,246 7,583 1.615
lOk-15k 12.4 15,163 12,506 1.212
lsk-20k 11.7 18,040 17,487 1.032
20k-30k 19.4 22,450 24,662 0.910
30k-40k 13.9 28,074 34,747 0.808
40k-50k 10.7 33,328 44,760 0.745
50k-75k 15.4 41,445 60,484 0.685
75k-lOOk 5.8 52,697 85,342 0.617
bOOk-200k 4.0 68,812 128,786 0.534
Over 200k 1.1 175,492 475,234 0.369National Retail Sales Tax63
consumption to income for households in various consumption and
income categories. This tabulation is based on the household records in
our expanded Tax File-CPS data file, with consumption values imputed
from the CES. The two imputations that we include in our incomemea-
sure in Table 5 and all subsequent tables are the value of space rent on
owner-occupied housing (in excess of cash housing outlays), and the
value of health care paid for by third parties such as employer-provided
health insurance or government health insurance programs. These items
are included in consumption, and excluding them from income would
overstate the consumption-to-income ratio.
The table shows consumption-to-income ratios for households ranked
by total consumption as well as income. The upper panel of Table 5
shows some variation in the consumption to income ratioacross con-
sumption categories. For households consuming less than $5,000per
year, the ratio of total consumption to total income is 0.85. The ratio for
higher consumption households varies between 0.74 and 0.82, with the
exception of very-high-consumption ($200,000 + per year) households,
for whom consumption as a share of income drops to 0.56. When house-
holds are ranked by income, the CIY ratio declines as income rises. The
CIY ratio at low income levels is substantially greater than unity. The
average value for households with incomes below $5,000 is 4.61, and this
statistic is an important determinant of some of the distributionalcom-
parisons that we report later in the paper. Total consumption exceeds
reported income in income categories up to $20,000 peryear. At very
high income levels, the CIY ratio falls to about one-third.
There are several possible explanations for the high consumption-to-
income ratios at low income levels. They may reflect measurementerror
in consumption or income, or under-reporting of income by these house-
holds. Branch (1994) discusses the quality of income reports in the CES,
and indicates that while property income appears to be under-reported,
other income reports seem consistent with data from, for example, the
Current Population Survey. If this C/Y pattern is due to unreported
income or income from the "underground economy," the implications
for our distributional analysis depend on how the income is spent. If
unreported income is due to activities outside the current income tax
reporting system, and it is spent on goods that are purchased through
ordinary retail channels, then the tax burden on households with high
reported C/Y ratios may rise under the retail sales tax, because their
transactions will be included in the tax base. If, however, the income
from underground economic activities is spent on other underground
activities that might not face the retail sales tax, then the reported C/Y
ratio may overstate the change in tax burdens.64Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
If unreported income is simply the result of response error onthe part
of survey participants, then actual income,and income tax liabilities,
will be substantially greater than our analysisfor low-income house-
holds suggests. In effect, some "low income"households should be
classified in higher income groups. We are not awareof any direct evi-
dence that can be used to evaluate thesealternative explanations of high
C/Y ratios.
There are other explanations for the high C/Yratios besides unre-
ported income, but they do not seem likely toaccount for what we
observe. The high consumption-to-incomeratios may reflect dissaving,
although this seems unlikely since few ofthe households with high
ratios report substantial asset holdings. They mayrepresent the effect of
inter-household transfers that are not well recordedin the CES. Unfortu-
nately, the CES does not include sufficientinformation to enable us to
develop potential corrections to what maybe data measurement weak-
nesses, at least without strongadditional assumptions. We hope to ad-
dress this issue further in future work.
Although the Consumer Expenditure Survey isthe best available data
base on household consumption spending, it isplagued by problems of
under-reported consumption. The aggregate measureof consumer spend-
ing in the National Income and ProductAccounts, PCE, is substantially
greater than the implied aggregate fromthe Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey.12 Table 6 presents summary information onthe level of consumption
spending in our data file, the ConsumerExpenditure Survey, and the
national accounts. The aggregate values from ourfile and the CES files are
not the same because our matchingprocedure imposes the income distri-
bution from our Tax FileCPS merge file onthe consumption-to-income
ratios from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.Table 6 shows that con-
sumption in both of the CES-based data setsis substantially below the
level reported in the National Income andProduct Accounts.
To address the problem of consumptionunder-reporting in the CES,
we multiply all of theconsumption flows in our data base by the ratio of
personal consumption expenditures in thenational accounts to the ag-
gregate spending level in our TaxFileCPS data file. For education, for
example, the NIPA aggregate is $66.0 billion,and the total from the Tax
FileCPSCES merge is $54.3 billion. We therefore scale upall education
expenditures in the Tax FileCPSCES merge by afactor of 1.215 to
12The ratio of food expenditures in the CES tofood expenditures in the national income
accounts was 0.66 for 1991. The analogous ratiofor alcoholic beverages was 0.25, for
clothing and shoes 0.51, for recreation 0.58, and foreducation 0.71. Further details on the
matching between the CES and national income accounts aggregates maybe found in
Gieseman (1987) and U.S. Department of Labor (1995).National Retail Sales Tax65
TABLE 6
Aggregate Consumption: NIPA, CES Family File, and Synthetic Tax-CPS-
CES-NMES Merge File ($ billions)
Source: NIPA data from January/February 1996 Survey of Current Business, CES tabulations from the CES
Family File provided by John Sabeihaus, and Tax File-CPS-CES-NMES tabulations from the data file
described in the text. Note that out-of-pocket medical costs of $155.0 bfflion were reported in the CES but
are not comparable to medical care costs reported in the NIPA, which includes payment by private and
public insurance plans. The estimate of the rental value of owner-occupied housing in the CES is twelve
times the reported monthly rental-equivalence value.
create the data file that we actually use for distributional analysis. We
calculate this ratio for food at home, away from home, housing, alcohol
expenditures, gasoline and motor oil, tobacco, charitable giving, educa-
tion, medical care, and all other spending.
This expenditure expansion procedure assumes that the understate-
ment of consumer expenditure in the CES is randomly distributed
across households in various income classes. This assumption is un-
likely to be valid. The Consumer Expenditure Survey top-codes income
and consumption flows, and it is therefore likely to be particularly
weak in describing the consumption behavior of high-income, high-
consumption households. CES responses are top-coded at various lev-
els, usually $100,000 or $200,000. Fifty-six of 5,065 households (1.1
percent) in the CES data file that we used were top-coded with respect
to income. A somewhat higher fraction of households experienced
some top-coding on particular consumption items. The top-coding prob-
lem makes it difficult to infer consumption patterns for households at
the top of the income and wealth distribution. We are not aware of any
data that would enable us to measure these consumption flows more
accurately, but we hope to consider this issue in greater detail in future
work.
1991 NIPACES aggregateTax-CPS-CES-NMES
Food: on and off premises 649.4 430.4 449.9
Tobacco 43.8 26.9 29.0
Alcohol: off premises 51.7 13.0 15.0
Clothing and shoes 211.2 107.3 na
Gasoline and motor oil 103.9 100.2 104.8
Other transportation costs 332.9 378.8 na
Recreation 292.0 169.6 na
Education 66.0 46.6 54.3
Rent 177.1 181.3 187.2
Owner-occupied housing 439.3 471.0 465.7
Medical care 668.7 154.0 672.2
Total expenditures 3,975.1 2,678.6 3,289.866Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
One further modification that we make to the CES data isconcerned
with owner-occupied housing. Our foregoing discussionof the retail
sales tax base emphasized the prepayment analysis ofowner-occupied
housing and the difficulty of taxing imputed rent. This approachresults
in a smaller retail sales tax base. We compute each CEShousehold's
expenditure on owner-occupied housing by multiplying the reported
market value of its home, as a share of the total market value of homes in
our CES-Tax File data base, by ourearlier estimate of the aggregate tax
base that would result from taxing purchases of owner-occupied hous-
ing. This procedure does not exploit information on thehouseholds that
actually bought homes, as the retail sales tax described in the first section
would, but it does succeed in allocating the retail sales tax on owner-
occupied homes to those households who own homes.
3.3 Imputing Medical Expenditures of Tax File-CPSHouseholds
One aspect of consumption outlay that is poorly covered in the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey is medical spending.The survey records only
out-of-pocket medical spending, so it omits all third-party payments by
insurance companies, Medicare, and Medicaid. Since theseexpenditures
would be included in the retail sales tax base, and since health care
spending accounted for 14.8 percent of personal consumptionexpendi-
tures in 1991, it is important to measure accuratelythis aspect of the
consumer budget. To do this we combineinformation from another data
base, the National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), with ourdata
base from the Tax File and the Current Population Survey.
The NMES is a nationally representative household surveythat con-
tacted roughly 20,000 families during 1987, gathering informationabout
demographic and economic characteristics, insurance coverage,and
medical spending. We aggregate individual NMES respondents into
"health insurance units": the family head, his or her spouse, anychil-
dren under age 19, and full-time students until they reach age 23.
We define medical expenditures as the sum of out-of-pocketspending
on medical care, spending that wasreimbursed by private insurance
policies including those provided by employers, and spending that was
reimbursed through government insurance programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid. We inflate the 1987 medical spending totals in theNMES
to comparability with 1991 data by multiplying spendingby the ratio of
1991 NIPA Medical Spending to 1987 NIPA spending.
Linking NMES and Tax File-CPS records requires a different matching
algorithm than the one that we used to link the CES records, because the
NMES does not include as much detail concerning income flows as the
CES. We therefore compute household income using as close a measureNational Retail Sales Tax67
to Form 1040 income as we can construct in the NMES, compute the
analogous measure in the Tax FileCPS data, and construct cells of
households according to household size, income, and whether there is
anyone over age 65 in the household. Our resulting aggregate spending
on medical care is 672.2 billion (see Table 6), compared with $668.7
billion in the 1991 National Income and Product Accounts. We therefore
multiply all medical outlays by 0.9948 to preserve comparability between
our aggregates and the national income account totals.
3.4 Imputing Corporate Income Taxes to Individual Tax Returns
To evaluate the effect of replacing personal and corporate incometaxes
with a retail sales tax, it is necessary to allocate corporate incometaxes to
individual taxpayers. Our imputation of these taxes is basedon Feld-
stein's (1988) approach, which assumes that the corporate incometax is
born by all those who hold any type of capital assets, not just those who
own claims on corporate capital.13 We focus on tax burdens when the
economy reaches its new long-run steady state, rather than the asset
price changes that might be associated with a shift from income tocon-
sumption taxation.
In 1991, corporate profit tax payments (CORPTAX), excludingpay-
ments by the Federal Reserve banks, totalled $89 billion. Total capital
income (CAPINC), which we define based on data in NIPA Tables 1.14
and 1.16, is the sum of net interest payments ($448.0 billion),corporate
dividend payments ($163.1 billion), corporate undistributed profits($77.7
billion), and rental income of persons after capital consumption adjust-
ment ($68.4 billion). This implies total capital income of $757.2 billion,or
16.0 percent of national income. Our definition of capital income excludes
proprietor's income, which with inventory valuation and capitalcon-
sumption adjustments totalled $362.9 billion in 1991. We exclude this
because it is difficult to distinguish the labor and capital incomecompo-
nents of proprietors' income. Adding proprietors' income to our forego-
ing definition would result in total capital income equal to 23.7percent of
national income, which accords with the "stylized fact" that capitalin-
come accounts for roughly one-quarter of national income.
Our algorithm for allocating corporate income taxes to households
13This approach dates at least to Harberger's (1962) analysis, and represents the natural
assumption given our focus on long-term steady-state distributional burdens. Feldstem
(1988) observes that some previous studies combining corporate and personal incometaxes
have made different incidence assumptions. In particular, Pechman (1985) considered four
possible allocations of the corporate income tax. Only one distributed the corporate income
tax in proportion to total capital income, and even then, the definition of capital income did
not accurately reflect the real incomes of capital owners.68Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
relies on three types of capital income received byhouseholds; divi-
dends, interest, and rental income. We proceed in three steps.First, we
adjust the national income accounts measures of interestreceipts an4
retained earnings to reflect the inflation-induced devaluationof corpo-
rate debt,14 which reduces real interest incomeand raises returns to
equity holders. We also transfer the income of pensionfunds from a
component of household sector interest income to a corporatesector
accrual, to reflect the prevalence of defined benefit pensionplans. Feld-
stein (1988) discusses the rationale for each of these adjustmentsin more
detail. These adjustments imply that our estimate ofadjusted equity
income, EQINC, is
EQINC = Dividends + Retained Earnings + Pension Earnings
+ Inflationary Gains on Corporate Debt
and that other capital income, OTHCAPINC, equals
OTHCAPINC = Rental Income + Interest Income
- Inflationary Gains on CorporateDebt
- Pension Earnings.
By construction, CAPINC = EQINC + OTHCAPINC.
The second step in our algorithm involves computing theshare of
each type of capital income received by each potential tax filer inthe Tax
FileCPS data file. We refer to potential tax filers because some current
nonfilers may have dividend, interest, or rental income, andthey may
consequently bear part of the corporate income tax. We useDIV1 to
denote dividend receipts by potential tax-filing unit i, INT1analogously
to represent gross interest income, andRENT to denote rental income.
Tax returns report rental income from many types ofproperties, but
there is no information on the rental value ofowner-occupied housing.
This is one of the most substantial components of rental incomein the
National Income and Product Accounts. We therefore useitemized de-
ductions for property taxes to construct a proxy for thevalue of owner-
occupied rental income for taxpayers who itemize. For taxpayerswho do
not itemize, and for nonfilers in our data base, weestimate the value of
owner-occupied rental income on the basis of property tax payments
14 The market value of corporate debt is estimated by capitalizing net interest paid by
corporations (NIPA Table 1.16, row 134b) by the BAA interest rate. Theinflation rate is
measured as the CPI inflation rate for all items less food and energy.National Retail Sales Tax69
imputed as part of the CES match. We sum the total amount of divi-
dends (DIV), interest (TNT1), and rental income (RENT) in the Tax File
CPS data base, and then compute the share of each component of this
income received by each household as
DIVSHR = DIV1 /DIV, INTSHR = TNT1 IINT,
and RENTSHR = RENT1! IJRENTJ.
Finally, we allocate total corporate taxes between equity income and
other capital income based on the shares of these two types of income in
total capital income, and then apportion these taxes to individual house-
holds. Each potential tax filer is imputed corporate taxes of CORP based
on the following formula:
[(OTHCAPINC)
< + RENTSHR) + - CAPINC
(EQINC)
] CAPINC
This procedure imputes to each dividend recipient taxes on the corpo-
rate earnings that made these dividends possible, as well as on an equi-
proportional share of the retained earnings generated in the corporate
sector.
Table 7 shows the allocation of dividends, real net interest, property tax
payments, as well as imputed corporate income tax revenues across
households in different income categories. The income categories in this
table are based on our expanded definition that includes imputations as in
Table 5. The receipt of nonhousing capital income is concentrated among
high-income households. Twenty percent of dividends are reported by
tax-filing units with incomes above $500,000. Households with incomes
above $200,000 report positive net interest receipts, while households in
all income classes between $40,000 and $200,000 report negative net inter-
est payments. Our imputation procedure assigns 24.0 percent of the cor-
porate income taxes that are allocated to households to those with family
income in excess of $500,000. Nearly eighteen percent of total dividends
are received by those with incomes of more than $1 million.
Table 7 shows that imputed corporate income tax liabilities are small
for most households. For the three-quarters of potential tax filers with
incomes between zero and $40,000, imputed corporate tax payments
average only $302 per year. For households with family incomes above
$1 million, however, the average imputed corporate tax is $250,196 per70Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
TABLE 7
Dividends, Interest, Property Taxes Paid, and Imputed Corporate
Income Taxes, by Income Class, 1991
Source: Authors' tabulations from Tax File-CPS data file. Amounts for taxpayers with negative income
are included in totals, but are not otherwise shown. See text for further discussion.
Net nominal Imputed
Tax units interest Propertycorporation
Income (1,000s)Dividends received tax paid tax
$Bilions by income class
0-10k 22,905 1.2 3.4 3.0 2.7
10-20k 24,151 3.1 10.6 7.4 7.6
20-30k 19,350 3.9 9.0 8.6 7.8
30-40k 13,913 4.4 2.8 8.9 6.1
40-50k 10,684 5.5 -0.8 8.7 5.5
50-75k 15,350 12.0 -13.8 18.2 7.8
75-100k 5,794 7.5 -9.1 9.8 4.2
100-200k 4,011 13.5 -4.7 10.2 10.8
200-500k 914 9.0 10.8 3.8 10.1
500-1,000k 141 4.5 8.4 1.1 5.8
Over 1,000k 64 12.2 25.0 0.9 16.0
Total 118,297 79.1 54.0 81.4 89.0
Tax units
(1,000s) Mean values per tax unit
0-10k 22,905 51 152 131 119
10-20k 24,151 129 440 308 314
20-30k 19,350 201 466 446 405
30-40k 13,913 317 200 639 440
40-50k 10,684 515 -78 818 516
50-75k 15,350 783 -897 1,186 505
75-lOOk 5,794 1,303 -1,575 1,688 732
100-200k 4,011 3,355 -117 2,541 2,702
200-500k 914 9,831 11,795 4,169 11,090
500-1,000k 141 31,765 59,277 7,481 41,284
Over 1,000k 64189,824 390,498 13,843 250,196
Mean 669 457 688 752year. Recognizing corporate income taxes is therefore critical to evaluat-
ing the distributional effects of retail sales tax plans that eliminate these
taxes.
3.5 Imputing Estate and Gift Tax Revenues to Individuals
Many proposals for replacing the income tax with a consumption tax
also call for elimination of the estate and gift tax. Federal receipts from
these taxes totalled $11.0 bfflion in 1991. Eliminating these taxes would
require a higher retail sales tax rate than if only the income tax were
replaced. Distributional analysis also requires an allocation scheme for
imputing estate and gift tax payments to potential tax filers. Because the
federal estate and gift taxes only apply to estates valued in excess of
$600,000, we assume that households that bear this tax have substantial
capital assets and associated capital income.15 We define capital income
(CAP) as the sum of dividends, taxable interest, capital gains, tax-
exempt bond interest, income from trusts, partnerships, Subchapter S
corporations, rents, and royalties. We then construct another variable,
CAP3OK, which equals the excess of capital income above $30,000:
CAP3OK = 0 if CAP < $30,000
CAP - 30,000 if CAP> $30,000.
To place the $30,000 cutoff in perspective, a household would have to
have held approximately $370,000 in Treasury bonds, yielding the 1991
nominal 30-year Treasury bond rate of 8.14 percent, to generate this flow
of capital income. Since most households with this level of financial
assets are also homeowners, their taxable estate would be greater than
their financial asset holdings.
We allocate the burden of estate and gift taxes in proportion to each
household's share of CAP3OK, but limit out imputation to households
with someone over the age of 65.16 This approach corresponds loosely to
an attempt to calculate the expected estate and gift tax payment for a
household in any year.17 The exact expression for this expected value is
(Probability of Death Within the Year) x (Estate Tax Due Conditional on
Death This Year). Since we do not have information on taxpayer ages,
15Our algorithm may under-estimate estate tax liabilities for some households with sub-
stantial owner-occupied real estate holdings but no other assets that generate taxable
capital income.
16This procedure implicitly assumes that the estate tax is proportional, and neglects the
rate structure progressivity of the tax.
17The U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (1993) develops a similar procedure,
based on capital income and age, for allocating estate and gift tax burdens.
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except insofar as we know if there is someone over age 65 in the tax filing
unit, we cannot use age-specific mortality rates in the first term of this
product. We also do not know the tax filer's total wealth, and thus
whether estate tax would in fact be due if the tax filer died this year. We
crudely approximate mortality risk by assuming that it is zero for those
under age 65, and positive but equal for all taxpayers with someone over
age 65 in the tax filing unit. This analysis assumes that theburden of the
estate tax falls on the decedent.
We let CAP30K denote the value of CAP30K for household i, and
AGE651 = 1 for tax filers who claim an exemption on their tax return for
an aged tax filer, and for nonfilers who report someone over age65 in
their CPS household. We then set w1 = AGE65 X CAP30K IAGE65J X
CAP30K.. Note that w1 will equal zero for most potential tax filing units.
We then define each tax filing unit's share of aggregate estate and gift
taxes as
E&GTAX1 = w1 X (Federal Estate & Gift Tax Receipts).
Table 8 shows the resulting allocation of estate and gift taxes across
households with various levels of family income. The table shows, not
TABLE 8
Distribution of Imputed Estate Tax Liabilities, by Income Class
Source: Authors' tabulations based on imputation algorithm described in the text. Entries reflect average
imputed estate and gift tax liability per potential income tax filing unit in each income category.
Amounts for taxpayers with negative income are induded in totals, but are not otherwise shown. See










0-10k 22,905 - 1
10-20k 24,151 1
20-30k 19,350 - 2
30-40k 13,913 0.1 5
40-50k 10,684 0.1 11
50-75k 15,350 0.8 55
75-100k 5,794 0.9 163
100-200k 4,011 2.4 591
200-500k 914 2.1 2,281
500-1,000k 141 1.1 8,117
Over 1,000k 64 3.2 50,590
All tax units 118,296 $11.0 93National Retail Sales Tax73
surprisingly, that our imputation procedure assigns most of the burden
of estate and gift taxes to high income households. Twenty-nine percent
of the estate and gift tax burden is allocated to households with incomes
of $1 million or more; another 10 percent is assigned to households with
incomes between $500,000 and $1,000,000. Households with incomes
below $30,000 per year are assigned essentially no tax liability under the
estate tax.
3.6 Imputing Wage Income from Form 1040 Joint Filers to
Household Members
One issue that arises in analyzing a retail sales tax as a replacement for
both the income and payroll taxes concerns the measurement of current
payroll tax liabilities. This requires information on the earnings of each
person in a household. Since Form 1040 only reports the total amount of
wage income earned by the tax filing unit, it is not possible to distin-
guish earnings by individuals filing joint returns. We therefore use data
from the Current Population Survey and match Tax File households with
more than one potential earner to CPS households on the basis of total
wages, family size, the presence of more than $2500 of capital income,
and the presence in the household of someone aged 65 or above. We use
the same approach that we developed in matching the CES to the Tax
File. We allocate CPS households to cells, identify the cell corresponding
to each Tax File household, randomly select one of the CPS households
in this cell, and use the ratio of wage income for the two earners in the
CPS household to allocate the total wage income of the Tax File house-
hold between the two earners.
4. COMPARING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX
BURDENS: INCOME TAXES AND RETAIL SALES
TAXES
We use our expanded Tax File to evaluate a tax reform that replaces the
federal income tax with a national retail sales tax. We consider four
possible retail sales taxes: one without any exemptions, one with an
exemption for food, one with an exemption for food, medical services,
and housing, and one coupled with a "demogrant" system that would
provide cash assistance to reduce the average tax burden on low income
households. We consider a retail sales tax that replaces only the federal
income tax, as well as one that replaces both the federal income tax
system and the payroll tax.
There are several ways to categorize households in creating distribu-74Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
lion tables to illustrate the effects of tax reform. Barthold and Jack (1995)
discuss a range of issues that arise in selecting the "income concept" that
should be used for classifying households in a distribution table; the
U.S. Congress Joint Committee on Taxation (1993) also reviews this
issue. "Snapshot" annual income, which shows a household's income
during a single year, suffers from a number of limitations as a measure of
household well-being. Income varies from one year to the next, and one
year's income may not reflect a household's position in the lifetime
income or well-being distribution.18 Yet the income measures in the Tax
File, and from the Current Population Survey, are exclusively snapshot
income measures.
One attractive alternative to annual income, suggested by Poterba
(1989) and subsequently applied by Metcalf (1994) and Caspersen and
Metcalf (1994), among others, suggests the use of consumption rather
than income to measure "lifetime income" in distribution analysis.19 In
light of the extreme values of the consumption-to-income ratio that we
observe in the CES data base, the use of total spending rather than
income as a measure of household well-being has substantial appeal. We
therefore begin with this approach to distributional comparisons, and
then present comparisons based on annual income classification.
Table 9 presents our central analysis of the comparative distribution of
tax burdens under the current income tax system and a retail sales tax.
The upper panel of the table shows the average taxes paid by house-
holds in each consumption category, while the lower panel shows the
tax rate, measured as the ratio of tax payments to the household's total
consumption.
The first column in Table 9 reports the number of potential tax filing
units in each consumption category for 1991, while the second column
shows the personal income tax liabifity for households in each group.2°
The entries in this column show that households with consumption
18Studies that discuss the fluctuation in annual income include Davies, St Hilaire, and
Whalley (1984), Fullerton and Rogers (1993), Metcalf (1994), Poterba (1989), and Slemrod
(1992).
19Caspersen and Metcalf (1994) compare long-term average income from the Panel Survey
of Income Dynamics, snapshot annual income, and total consumption as alternative bases
for allocating households to distribution classes. They find that results from the long-term
income measure fall between those with consumption and snapshot income. Fullerton and
Rogers (1993) also develop an explicit measure of lifetime income for households.
20Our analysis follows the standard, if debatable, practice of using tax liabilities rather
than a utility-based measure of welfare loss in describing the burden of taxes for different
income groups. Barthold (1993) and Bradford (1995) provide excellent introductions to
many of the difficulties with this approach to distribution analysis. Fullerton and Rogers
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between $5,000 and $10,000 per year make average income tax payments
of $643 per year, while their average total income tax liabifity, including
corporate income taxes and the estate and gift tax, is $960 per year.
Households with lower consumption levels (0$5,000) paradoxically re-
port higher average tax burdens than those in the $5,000-10,000 category;
in part this reflects the greater incidence of households with substantial
capital income in this group. It also suggests that households with very
low reported consumption may have consumption that is measured
with error.
The average income tax and total tax burden rises with household
consumption. The average income tax burden for households with con-
sumption in excess of $200,000 per year is $157,518. Including the corpo-
rate and estate tax burdens on such households raises their total tax
liability to $229,131 per year.
The fourth through sixth columns of Table 9 show the distribution of
average tax burdens under the retail sales tax. Column fourdescribes the
retail sales tax with the broadest base, with no exemptions for particular
sub-categories of consumption. The required retail sales tax rate in this
case is 17.2 percent. The average tax burden on households nearbut not
at the bottom of the consumption distribution increases relative to the
tax burden under the income tax system. For the somewhat unusual
group reporting consumption of less than $5,000 per year,however, the
tax burden declines substantially with the adoption of the retail sales tax.
For households with consumption between $5,000 and $10,000 per year,
the average tax burden rises from $960 to $1,321. At very high consump-
tion levels, the tax burden is lower under the retail sales tax than under
the income tax. Those households with consumption between $100,000
and $200,000 per year, for example, make average tax payments of
$36,032 under the income tax system. They would pay an average of
$22,383 under the retail sales tax.
The next two columns of Table 9 ifiustrate the effect of excluding food,
or food, medical care, and housing, from the retailsales tax base. The
effect of these changes on the distribution of tax burdens is relatively
small, although the required retail sales tax rates rise to 19.8 percent and
30.3 percent, respectively. While these exemptions reduce the tax bur-
den on low consumption households and raise the share of the retail
sales tax that is paid by high consumption households, the effects are
muted. Even exempting the three "necessities" from the retail sales tax
base, the average tax burden on households with consumption between
$5,000 and $10,000 declines by only $153, from $1,321 to $1,168 in com-
parison with the broadest-base retail sales tax. This is because the CES
data indicate that the share of household expenditures allocated to theseNational Retail Sales Tax77
consumption categories changes relatively little as one moves up the
consumption distribution. Exempting particular goods from the retail
sales tax base therefore proves to be a weak method of altering the
distribution of tax burdens across households.
The last column in Table 9 shows the impact of switching from the
current income tax system to a retail sales tax with a demogrant provi-
sion that would provide each household with a lump-sum transfer equal
to the retail sales tax rate times the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992)
poverty threshold for a family of their size.21 The total retail sales tax
burden on low-consumption households declines, and in some cases
becomes negative, with this demogrant proposal. The retail sales tax
burden on high consumption households is also increased by the
demogrant, because financing the demogrant requires a higher retail
sales tax rate. These results suggest that demogrants are powerful instru-
ments for altering the distribution of tax burdens across households in
different consumption categories.
One feature of the demogrant that is not illustrated in our tables is its
differential effect on families of different sizes. The demogrant will re-
duce the effective tax burden by more on large households than on small
households, conditional on their expenditure or income level.
The lower panel of Table 9 presents information on the "average tax
rate" paid by households in different consumption classes. These tax
rates are defined as the ratio of taxes paid to the measure of household
well being, in this case total consumption outlays. The results provide
an alternative perspective on the basic findings that are shown in the
upper panel of the table. When the retail sales tax is paired with a
demogrant, the average tax rate is negative for households at the bottom
of the consumption distribution, 2.6 percent, for example, for those
with consumption between $5,000 and $10,000, and it rises as household
consumption rises to approach 26.5 percent, the statutory retail sales tax
rate, at the highest consumption levels. For the broad-based retail sales
tax without any exemptions and without a demogrant, the tax rate on
household consumption is the same for households in all consumption
categories.
Table 10 uses a more traditional annual income classifier to allocate
households to categories in the distribution table. The income concept
we use includes the imputed value of rent from owner-occupied hous-
ing, in excess of cash housing outlays, as well as our estimate of the
21It might be difficult to administer such a demogrant if the current income tax administra-
five structure were largely dismantled. Some advocates of fundamental tax reform suggest
that this is an important goal of reform; this may affect the set of distributional policies that

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2National Retail Sales Tax79
value of medical care paid for by third parties (i.e. not paid for out-of-
pocket). The broad pattern of results is similar to that in Table 9, but
there are several notable differences. First, when households are ranked
by income, those in the lowest income categories show very small in-
come tax liabilities under the current system, primarily as a result of the
Earned Income Tax Credit. Because many very low income households
report substantial consumption outlays, the increase in average tax bur-
dens between the income tax and the retail sales tax is substantial. For
households with incomes between $5,000 and $10,000, for example, aver-
age tax liabifity rises from a small value, $51 dollars, under the income
tax system, to a substantial value, $2,106, under the retail sales tax
without any exemptions.
Second, the decline in tax burdens on high income households is even
sharper than the decline for high consumption households when the
income tax is replaced by the retail sales tax. Because high income house-
holds account for a lower share of consumption than income, their rela-
tive tax burdens fall under the retail sales tax. Households with incomes
in excess of $200,000 per year are estimated to pay an average of $139,624
under the current income tax, but their tax burden falls to $30,185 under
the broadest base retail sales tax. Households with incomes below
$50,000 are estimated to pay more under the retail sales tax than under
the current income tax system, while those with incomes above $75,000
are estimated to face lower tax bills under the retail sales tax.
Third, the effect of the demogrant scheme is similar when households
are categorized by income and by consumption. For households with
total income between $5,000 and $10,000, for example, the average tax
burden with the demogrant is 12.3 percent, compared with 27.8 percent
for the retail sales tax without a demogrant. For high income households
tax burdens correspondingly rise, reflecting the higher tax rate that is
associated with the demogrant-inclusive retail sales tax.
The lower panel of Table 10 presents information on average tax rates
under the various tax proposals. In this case the denominator for the tax
rate calculations is total household income before taxes. The broad pat-
tern of results resembles those for average tax burdens, and the effects of
the demogrant plan are clear in these data as well. For those with in-
comes between $100,000 and $200,000, the tax rate is 9.2 percent under
the broadest-based retail sales tax, and 12 percent with the demogrant.
Tables 11 and 12 present similar calculations for the case in which
the retail sales tax replaces both the federal income tax and the payroll
tax. The broad pattern of distributional results is similar to that in
Tables 9 and 10. The retail sales tax rates that are required to raise



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































482Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
greater than those that are required when only the income tax isreplaced
by the retail sales tax.
5.. STEADY-STATE VERSUS TRANSITIONISSUES IN
DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS
Our analysis focuses on the long-run steady state comparison between
the distribution of tax burdens under the retail sales tax and the current
income tax system. In moving from the current tax code to the new
steady state, however, there may be important transitional consider-
ations that largely determine the short-run incidence of tax reform.
Many of these issues involve differences in asset holdings acrosshouse-
holds, and the effect of tax reform on asset values. Because of difficulties
in linking information on asset holdings to the Tax FileCPS data base,
we have not considered these issues. Othertransitional issues, as well as
long-run issues, hinge on whether households receive "indexed" trans-
fer payments, and how the real value of these transfers would respond
to the adoption of a retail sales tax.
In this section we address several topics related to the transition from
an income tax to a consumption tax. Webegin by considering the price
level response to replacement of an income tax with a retail sales tax, and
we then consider other issues including the responseof asset prices to
the tax reform.
5.1 Consumer Prices and the Retail Sales Tax
The consumer price impact of switching from an income tax to a retail
sales tax is important for two distinct reasons. The first is a short-run
transition issue, concerning the macroeconomic effects of the tax switch.
The second is a long-run incidence issue, concerning the burden of the
retail sales tax on the recipients of potentially-indexed government trans-
fer payments. We begin with a brief discussion of the short-run transi-
tion issues.
To understand how retail prices would respond to the tax reformconsid-
ered in the last section, consider the simple analytics of substituting a
retail sales tax for an income tax in a stylized economy without saving or
investment. Assume that the economy is initially in equilibrium with an
income tax rate of 20 percent, so that if nominal pretax wagesequal 100,
net-of-tax wages as well as consumption equal 80, while tax revenue and
government spending equal 20. Since the government purchases 20 units
of the final good, consumers purchase 80. Now consider replacing the
income tax with an equal-yield 25 percent retail sales tax, and assumethat
nominal wages remain at 100, so that after-tax wages are now 100. IfNational Retail Sales Tax83
producer prices do not change, but producers simply add the retail sales
tax to the amount charged to consumers, then consumers will spend 100,
but 20 of that amount will represent sales tax, and 80 will represent a
payment to producers. Total taxes and government consumption will
again equal 20, so that producers will still receive 100 from their total sales,
after remitting sales taxes of 20 to the government. The producers' total
receipts under the sales tax, including the sales tax collections, equal 120,
since government purchases of 20 are not taxed and are added to con-
sumer tax-inclusive spending of 100. Under the income tax regime, pro-
ducers received 100 from their sales. They may have remitted 20 to the
government as withheld income tax for their workers.
In this example, all relative prices remain the same in these two
equilibria. The critical determinant of real activity is the after-tax real
wage, (1 - 7)w / p(l + 0), where T denotes the income tax rate, 0 the
retail sales tax rate, w the nominal pre-tax wage, andp the producer
price leve1.The consumer price level, defined inclusive of retail sales
taxes, will increase in this scenario because, with p fixed, p(l + 0) rises
when 0 changes from zero to a positive value.
How a switch from direct to indirect taxation affects the demand for
nominal money balances is more subtle than the question of whether it
would raise the tax-inclusive Consumer Price Index (CPI). In many stan-
dard models, the foregoing analysis suggests that an increase in the
money supply is needed to accommodate the change to a new tax sys-
tem. Consider the case in which the demand for nominal money bal-
ances (f) depends on the nominal value of consumption transactions,
C x p x (1 + 0), and in particular includes the value of sales taxes but
not income taxes. In this case money market equffibrium requires that
M = f(C x p X (1 + 0)
where M denotes nominal money supply and r denotes the interest rate.
The tax switch from income to consumption taxes, which increases 6,
would require a one-time increase in the nominal money supply to avoida
need for a decline in nominal producer prices. Mankiw and Summers
(1986) provide a more complete discussion of the choice of variables in the
money demand function, and the implications of alternative assumptions
for the analysis of fiscal policy reforms. Our analysis abstracts from the
effect of the after-tax interest rate on money demand; this interest rate
might rise as a consequence of tax reform.
22Hall (1996) and Bradford (1996) discuss these transition dynamics in some detail.
Poterba, Rotemberg, and Summers (1986) present some evidence on the macroeconomic
effects of Britain's income tax-to-consumption tax transition in the late 1970s.84Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
The critical maintained assumption in many standard specifications of
money demand is that consumers require cash balances to payretail sales
taxes, but not to pay income taxes. If the appropriate scalingvariable for
nominal money demand is in fact C x p x (1 + 9) + T X Y X p, where Y
denotes real income and Tthe income tax rate, then a shift from income to
consumption taxation might not require a monetary accommodation. This
approach would argue for deflating nominal money balances not by the
CPI including only sales taxes, but by a price index that included income
taxes as well (Bull and Lindsey, 1996, discuss relatedissues). Further
empirical work could usefully examine the relative effect of direct and
indirect taxes on money demand.
Whether the consumer price index is measured inclusive of the retail
sales tax rate but not the income tax rate can have important conse-
quences for the long-term incidence of the taxreform. Many households
receive government transfer payments that are indexed to the measured
CPI. In our example above, if the consumer price index iscalculated
inclusive of the federal retail sales tax, then even if nominal producer
prices do not adjust to the tax change, the measured consumer price
index would rise. This will result in increased government spending on
transfer programs, and it will reduce the tax burden on those who rely
on these programs for their income.Our distributional analyses have
not considered potential effects through this channel.
Calculating the CPI inclusive of the retail sales tax would also result in
spurious disruption of the real value of many indexed transfers inthe
private economy. Our earlier example illustrates that no change innomi-
nal wages is needed to preserve the real purchasing power of labor
income, since income taxes on wages are being replaced by sales taxes
on purchases. Increasing nominal wagesunder indexed labor contracts,
to reflect the rise in the tax-inclusive consumer price index,would there-
fore represent an increase in the real after-tax wage received by labor.
One potential solution to disrupting nominal contracts as a result ofthis
arbitrary distinction is to change the definition of the CPI to help main-
tain the intended meaning of index-linked contracts. A revised con-
sumer price index, which included income taxes as partof the cost of
living, could be introduced before the transition, eliminating most prob-
lems with indexed contracts. Poterba, Rotemberg, and Summers (1986)
note that this was part of the transitional arrangement inthe United
Kingdom in 1979, when there was a significant shift from direct to indi-
rect taxation.
23If transfer payments are not indexed, then those who receive transfer income that is not
taxed under the current income tax would be worse off under the retail sales tax.National Retail Sales Tax 85
5.2 Asset Revaluation Effects
One of the major incidence effects of a shift from income to consumption
taxation is likely to be associated with the revaluation of claims to various
assets. The real value of owner-occupied homes, of shares in corpora-
tions, and of debt claims could all be affected by a shift in the tax base.
Households differ in their holdings of these assets, and correspondingly
would face different gains or losses from tax reform. Gentry and Hubbard
(1997) focus on these aspects of consumption tax incidence. Kotlikoff
(1993) emphasizes transition effects as the critical determinant of the
short-run incidence of replacing the income tax with a consumption-
based tax. He points out that switching instantaneously to a consumption
tax places a substantial burden on households that have accumulated
assets under the income tax system with the intention of consuming the
principal from these assets in the future. Such households would have
formulated their consumption plan on the assumption that they would
not be taxed on their consumption, yet the switch to a consumption tax
would in fact place a tax burden on such spending.24 The nature of these
transition effects depends substantially on individual circumstances. Indi-
viduals who have accumulated assets in tax-deferred saving accounts, for
example, would not face a shock to their prospective tax burden in the
way that those who have accumulated in traditional after-tax accounts
would.
This type of transition effect is best illustrated by considering an individ-
ual who owns a bond that promises a finite-lived stream of nominal future
payments, consisting of interest and principal. When the income tax is
replaced by the retail sales tax, assuming that the tax-inclusive consumer
price index rises, the purchasing power of the bond's nominal principal
repayments (but not the interest payments) falls. The reduction in future
household consumption opportunities associated with such asset revalua-
tions is not captured in our distribution tables. This implies that distribu-
tion tables of the type we have constructed do not reflect the substantial
horizontal inequity across households within income or consumption
cells that wifi be associated with the revaluation of the real purchasing
power of portfolio assets. Because asset holdings are concentrated among
24 This logic applies to planned consumption that would be financed from the principal
value of assets held at the time of the transition, but not to consumption that would be
financed from the future income generated by these assets. Someone who planned to use
future interest income to finance their consumption would face a sales tax on their expendi-
ture, but this would be offset by the reduced income tax burden on their interest income.
No such offset applies to consumption financed by drawing down principal. Thus the
consumption tax places the largest incremental burden on those who have accumulated
assets and who plan to consume these assets soon.86Feenberg, Mitrusi & Poterba
households with higher income and consumption levels, most of the asset
revaluation effects would be concentrated among these households. Pro-
viding a more detailed analysis of this issue requires information on the
patterns of asset holdings, consumption, and income across households.
6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE ISSUES
We find that switching from the current income tax system to a national
retail sales tax without direct transfers to low-income households can
substantially alter the distribution of tax burdens. When households are
ranked by their total consumption spending, which is our preferred
method of constructing distribution tables, the burden of the retail sales
tax is either proportional to consumption outlays, or rises as a share of
outlays when the retail sales tax plan is coupled with a "demogrant"
proposal. When households are ranked by annual income in construct-
ing distribution tables, we find that the tax burden on high income
households is generally lower under the retail sales tax than under the
income tax. This pattern arises from the greater share of income that is
devoted to consumption at low income levels, from the progressivity of
the rate structure in the current personal income tax, in comparison with
the flat rate embodied in a retail sales tax, and because the corporation
income tax and estate and gift taxes, which are part of the income tax
system, place substantially greater burdens on high-income than on
low-income households. These results confirm the findings in other stud-
ies of comparative steady-state distribution of tax burdens, such as Gale,
Houser, and Scholz (1996) and Metcalf (1994), which have focused only
on the replacement of the individual income tax with a consumption-
based tax system.
In developing our distributional comparisons, we have substantially
extended the capacity of the NBER TAXSIM model to address a range of
tax reform options. We have linked the Individual Tax File with informa-
tion on household consumption and medical spending. This data link-
age is an essential step in moving beyond the analysis of income tax
reforms, and considering changes in the tax base. It follows in the spirit
of extended data bases that are used by various government agencies to
analyze potential tax reforms.
Despite this advance, we have not surmounted many of the difficult
issues that are associated with the analysis of distribution tables. These
include the lack of information on income and expenditures over longer
horizons, and the absence of general equilibrium feedback effects in our
analysis. Bradford (1995) notes many of the shortcomings of this ap-
proach, and calls particular attention to the impact of these limitationson the apparent distribution of consumption-based rather than income-
based taxes.
The procedure we have used, which involves the construction of
"cells" of similar households in the Tax File and other data bases, fol-
lowed by imputation based on these cells, could in principle be applied
to impute additional data to tax filing units. Two types of information
would be particularly valuable: data on transitory versus permanent
income, and data on household asset holdings. A number of studies
have shown that indirect taxes are more regressive when households are
categorized on the basis of their annual income than when they are
allocated to income categories based on a measure of lifetime income,
and underscored the need for a longer-term perspective in analyzing tax
burdens. It would therefore be very useful to expand the current data
base to include information on longer-term measures of household in-
come. One option would involve using data bases that record multi-year
income observations, such as the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics or
the IRS tax return panel, to append information on multi-year income
profiles to the Tax File.
We are less optimistic about the prospects for linking information on
household asset holdings to data records in the Tax File. The most com-
plete data source for asset holdings, the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF), is a relatively small survey. Thus the problems that we encoun-
tered in creating cells based on households in the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey would be more severe with the SCF. We nevertheless hope
to investigate the importance of these difficulties in future work.
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